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SUMMARY 
An air defense system is composed of a complex combination of 
stochastic processes. It is difficult to determine strategies that will optimize 
the system performance. Decisions concerning the utilization and deployment 
of the defensive forces are often based on intuition. 
This investigation studies the effect of defense line location on combat 
results to determine if an optimum position exists. The system is studied 
through the construction of a computer model and subsequent analysis of the 
data generated by simulation. The model is programmed for the Univac 1108 
computer, utilizing the General Purpose System Simulator n (GPSS IE). A 
hypothetical air defense system, composed of 25 interceptor aircraft, opposes 
an attacking force of 75 manned bombers. The defense line location is varied 
systematically to study the response at six different positions. The average 
numbers of escaping bombers for each defense line location are statistically 
analysed. 
Results of the study indicate that defense line location does have a signifi­
cant effect on overall system performance; and, for a specified system, there 
exists some optimum location of the defense perimeter. Sensitivity analysis indi­
cates that the optimum position is sensitive to the intercept time parameter. 
Results of the study imply that consistent performance of an air defense system 




Since a nation's very existence may depend on its ability to defend itself 
against a single massive air attack, the problem of maintaining an effective air 
defense capability is obviously a vital one. Military analyst and research groups 
have made numerous studies of the air defense system with the intent of increas­
ing its effectiveness through better employment of the weapons available. New 
defensive weapons are continually being developed to counter the expected technolo­
gical improvements in the offensive forces. War games and exercises are con­
ducted periodically to evaluate and update existing systems and to suggest needs 
for future systems. 
This highly complex, rapidly changing defense system is the responsibility 
of an air defense commander who, in the course of a battle, must make many diffi­
cult decisions with far-reaching consequences. He must resolve such issues as 
which enemy bombers constitute the greatest threat; which interceptors to utilize 
against which targets; and where, as well as when, to deploy his interceptor force 
to meet the invaders. To further confound the situation, the very nature of battle 
creates many elements of uncertainty. Clausewitz (1) has said that war is largely 
a matter of chance. In war, a larger margin must be left for error than in any 
other sphere of human activity. Thus it is essential that the defense commander 
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be provided with the maximum amount of sound quantitative analysis in order to 
minimize the number of decisions that must be made under a high degree of 
uncertainty. 
It is the purpose of this investigation to add to the knowledge of air defense 
theory by quantitatively analyzing one aspect of the defense system. Namely, an 
attempt will be made to determine the most effective location of the air battle 
defense line, which is the line where defensive forces engage the penetrating 
offensive forces. This information is expected to assist the air defense comman­
der in establishing the defensive posture so that efficient utilization of interceptor 
aircraft will be realized. In addition, the research will be of value in analyzing 
air defense exercises and in planning future defense system modifications. 
Background 
The history of warfare is as old as the history of man himself. From the 
dawn of civilization, man has been faced with the necessity of defending both his 
territory and his life against the onslaughts of his enemies. 
When small groups of armed men first began to fight under the leadership 
of a single man, that man did not have to be a learned and skilled strategist. His 
chief assets were his physical prowess and his proficiency in wielding the imple­
ments of war. These factors, plus the ability to inspire and dominate his followers, 
were all the tools he required to be a successful military leader. As the art of war 
became more sophisticated, with growing armies and more destructive weapons, 
military strategy began to play an important role in the conduct of warfare. As 
early as 500 B. C . , an oriental general named Sun Tzu is reported to have said: 
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"The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the 
battle is fought (2) ." Thus the science of war began to emerge with the accumu­
lation of a body of scientific knowledge upon which to base military strategy. 
In the 1800's, Prussian military leaders contributed greatly to the develop­
ment of war as a science. Their elaborate war games were crude forerunners 
of the computerized war games that are so widely used in military analysis today. 
Thus, at the dawn of the twentieth century, a large amount of information and 
theory (not necessarily valid) was available concerning the conduct of ground war­
fare as well as naval warfare. Battles in the air, with the exception of balloon 
warfare, were still confined largely to the imagination. 
Air defense is a relative infant in the family of general warfare and so does 
not have an extensively developed body of knowledge. Yet, sound strategy is prob­
ably more vital to the air defense commander than to a commander of ground 
forces. The destructive potential and high speed of an attacking bomber force 
serve to magnify the effects of poor defensive strategy. It was not until World 
War II, when the British Royal Air Force defended Great Britain against over­
whelming German air attacks, that air defense became a noted element of warfare. 
In past military conflicts, as in most ground battles fought today, the initial 
engagement with the enemy was seldom decisive. Usually there was time for the 
defender to re-group his forces and revise his strategy in the light of the most 
recent situation. This is no longer so. We are now faced with the prospect of an 
initial air attack also being the final battle, or even barring that eventuality, the 
loser of the initial battle could be expected to suffer such disastrous casualties that 
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further military efforts would be ineffectual at best. The air defense system can­
not be evaluated under actual combat conditions, and thus, one sees that the task 
of determining effective strategies under uncertain conditions and with untried 
weapons poses a formidable problem. 
Fortunately, the growth of operations research and systems analysis during 
and after World War II provides at least a partial solution to the problem. By using 
analytical tools, such as war games and computer simulation models, the systems 
analyst can propose and investigate theories which may prove fruitful. Clausewitz, 
who placed more reliance on tactics than on strategy, is quoted as saying: 
If theory investigates the subjects which constitute War; if it separates 
more distinctly that which at first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains 
fully the properties of the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it 
makes evident the nature of objects; if it brings to bear all over the field 
of War the light of essentially critical investigation — then it has fulfilled 
the chief duties of its province. (3) 
Of course, the soundest theory or strategy will not provide a final solution 
to a battle problem and it certainly cannot make an actual decision. The military 
commander is an executive who, in the final essence, must make decisions based 
on his experience, his judgment of the situation, and his intuition. Fisher (4) 
accurately assesses the role that systems analysis should play in decision making. 
He suggests that the main role of analysis should be to sharpen the intuition and 
judgment of the decision maker. 
Air Defense Scenario 
To prepare the reader for the development and discussion of the simulation 
model in following chapters, it is appropriate to give here a brief description of a 
typical air defense situation. A more comprehensive description is given by 
Mallan (5) . 
An attacking force of bomber aircraft is detected by the defending force's 
warning network at the "warning l ine." The attacking force is allowed to penetrate 
unopposed until reaching the "defense line," at which position the defensive force 
of interceptor aircraft engages the bomber force. Each bomber is attacked by an 
individual interceptor, and there is a certain probability that the bomber will be 
destroyed. If not destroyed, it continues its penetration and must be re-attacked. 
The objective of the defensive force is to neutralize, or "kill," each of 
the attacking aircraft before the bombers reach the "bomb release l ine." Each 
interceptor has a certain airborne endurance capability and can carry a given 
quantity of armament. Therefore, its time spent at the defense line is limited 
by both endurance (fuel) and by armament (number of firing passes). Interceptors 
are shuttled between the defense line and the "interceptor base," where they are 
re-fueled and re-armed for return to the battle area. An illustration of the gene­
ral battle setting is shown in Figure 1. 
Study Objectives 
From the foregoing description of an air defense situation, it can be seen 
that there are many parameters that may affect the outcome of the battle. Only a 
few of these parameters are directly under the control of the defense commander. 
One controllable parameter might logically be the location of the defense line. At 
one extreme, this battle line would be located at the maximum radius of action of 
the interceptors, or at the other extreme, it would be located at the bomb release 
* * * » * * ' * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * WARNING LINE 
(Attacking Forces) 
* * * # * * - » * * * * * * * * * * * • » • » • » * DEFENSE LINE 






Figure 1. General Air Defense Situation. 
7 
line. It is likely that some intermediate position would produce better results 
than either extreme. The overall objective of this study is to determine which 
location, of all the alternatives considered, yields the best battle results. 
The specific objectives of this study in the order of their investigation 
are: 
(1) Formulate a relevant system of quantitative relationships that ade­
quately describe an air defense problem. 
(2) Construct a computer simulation model of the system using the 
GPSS n simulation language. 
(3) Utilize the computer model to simulate the system and obtain battle 
results for selected values of defense line distance, as measured from the bomb 
release line. 
(4) Analyze the data obtained from the simulations to determine which 
defense line position is most advantageous for the defenders. 
The measure of effectiveness used in evaluating the simulated battle 
results is the number of bombers that reach the bomb release line. The average 
bomber neutralization distance, measured from the bomb release line, will be used 
to gain additional insight into the system behavior. 
Scope and Limitations 
The computer simulation model developed in this study considers only a 
small scale air battle involving the lower operational levels of the air defense 
structure. The conditions under which the experiments are run imply a strategic 
defense concept. That is, a long range detection capability is assumed and the 
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defensive forces operate under a single commander. However, the model can 
easily be expanded to a larger scale problem, or can be adapted to a tactical 
situation. The model is so constructed as to enable an expansion of the inter­
ceptor force to 100 aircraft, and the size of the attacking force is limited only 
by the GPSS n restriction that no more than 1000 transactions can be in the system 
at one time. Other parameters such as detection range, speeds of all aircraft, 
time functions, kill probabilities, etc. can be readily changed to adapt the model 
to a variety of situations. 
The system modeled is restricted to manned aircraft. No consideration 
is given to either surface-to-air missiles or air-to-ground missiles. The inter­
ceptor armament, however, could be missiles or conventional aircraft guns. 
The following assumptions were made in modeling the air defense system. 
(1) All bombers are detected at the same range and are tracked continu­
ally with no lost contact at any time. 
(2) All bomber aircraft penetrate on a straight line in a direction perpen­
dicular to the defense line and bomb release line. 
(3) The probability of obtaining a kill is constant for all intercept attempts. 
(4) Interceptor aircraft are considered to have the necessary speed advan­
tage over the bombers to overtake them and complete intercepts, even though the 
bombers may have penetrated behind the defense line. 
(5) All intercept attempts result in a firing pass. That is, no intercept 
is broken off because of some error by the defense. 
(6) No interceptors are lost due to direct enemy action. The only 
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interceptor losses are assumed to occur at the interceptor base during the 
turnaround. 
(7) Interceptor service and turnaround times at the interceptor base are 
independent of the number of interceptors requiring service at any given time. 
(8) Bomber altitude is not considered to have any direct effect on the time 
required to complete an intercept. 
The first assumption is probably the most unrealistic. However, in most 
circumstances only a small percentage of the attacking force would present a detec­
tion and tracking problem. Since the problem would exist for all defense line loca­
tions, it should have little effect on the optimum location of the defense perimeter. 
The last assumption is partially compensated for by using a probability distribution 
for the time required to complete an intercept. The other assumptions are felt to 





History of Simulation 
An examination of the literature reveals that the word simulation has 
many different meanings. Because of the prominent role played by the electronic 
digital computer in our modern world, it has become fairly common to consider 
simulation as being a recent development made possible by the computer. Naylor 
(6) gives a definition of the term which embodies the common concepts of simu­
lation: 
Simulation is a numerical technique for conducting experiments on a 
digital computer, which involves certain types of mathematical and logical 
models that describe the behavior of a business or economic system ( or 
some component thereof) over extended periods of real time. 
A less restricted definition of the term, however, is necessary in order 
to view simulation in its true historical perspective. McCoy (7) suggests that 
simulation was probably one of man's earliest techniques for studying complex 
problems. Dalkey (8) provides a more general definition of simulation: "The 
word 'simulation,' a distant relative of the term 'similar, 1 refers to a construct 
which resembles the process or system to be studied but which is easier to manip­
ulate or investigate." Geisler and Ginsberg (9) define simulation in a similar 
sense, although they consider three separate categories: 
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(1) One-to-one simulation which encompasses most mock-up training 
devices; 
(2) Game-type simulation which involves the human element; and 
(3) All-computer simulation into which category this research simulation 
model would fall. 
When viewed in the proper perspective, simulation is seen to be an old 
and established technique for solving complex problems that cannot be analytically 
determined. Evans (10) indicates that simulation has its origin in the study of 
systems. According to McLeod (11), man has been simulating since he first began 
to use his imagination. Forrester (12) points out that simulation was used in man's 
early history to obtain celestial navigation tables that were used for world explora­
tion. The development of elaborate war games to study military operations was 
one of the earlier uses of simulation techniques. 
However, until the electronic computer became available, the cost of simu­
lation rendered it generally unsuitable as a method of analyzing complex systems. 
Two developments probably acted in conjunction with one another to account for the 
tremendous utilization of simulation in recent years. One, previously mentioned, 
was the development of the electronic digital computer which made it economically 
feasible to perform simulations involving vast numbers of computations that previ­
ously could not have been accomplished readily by hand. The other factor was the 
rapid growth of the field of operations research during and after World War II. The 
increased emphasis on the study of systems and the growing utilization of the tools 
of the systems analyst opened up new horizons for the technique of simulation. 
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Military Applications 
Simulation has long been a widely used tool of the military strategist. 
One of its early applications involved the development of battle plans utilizing the 
"sandbox battlefield." This technique made use of an iconic model (often actually 
created in a sandbox) to simulate possible battles in order to study the effects of 
various strategies on the outcome of the battle. Today one has only to make a 
cursory review of the relevant literature to see the widespread influence of simu­
lation on military analysis and planning. 
Military simulations run the gamut from huge, highly sophisticated 
strategic war games to very small simulations of individual actions. Dalkey (13) 
describes two extremes developed by the RAND Corporation. At one extreme is 
the global air war model designated STAGE, which requires several hours of com­
puter time on the IBM 7090 computer for a single run. The preparation of inputs 
alone requires the investment of hundreds of man-days. At the other end of the 
scale is FLIOP, which simulates a single bomber during a single attack mission. 
Military applications of simulation are not restricted to war gaming and 
battle simulation. Other areas of military operations also make extensive use of 
simulation. Management studies, cost-effectiveness studies, logistics planning, 
and research and development programs are only a few of the areas particularly 
suitable for simulation study. 
Geisler and Ginsberg (14) give a reasonable explanation of why simulation 
has such wide military application. They state that there are usually two system 
characteristics which lead to the use of simulation, and military systems normally 
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possess both characteristics. These characteristics are complex relationships 
among the system variables and the existence of a number of stochastic processes. 
Evans (15) explains why analytical techniques, such as computer simu­
lation, must often be used as a scientific basis for analyzing military conflicts. 
Battles are never replicated, and very rarely are they adequately observed and 
recorded. These facts render them inadequate as scientific experiments, and the 
information gained from them can seldom be used to guide scientific analysis or 
support scientific conclusions. Thus, simulation is frequently the only method 
available to the military analyst for studying complex military problems. 
Problems and Limitations 
Despite its widespread application to problem analysis, simulation does 
have limitations, just as any other analytical technique. One needs to take into 
consideration several important factors regarding its application. Sheppard (16) 
warns of the tendency to view simulation as a universal problem solver. All too 
often, operations research practitioners are swept away by their enthusiasm and 
begin to view simulated problems as a pseudo-real world. Ancker (17) cautions 
against overcomplicating simulation models by pointing out that as the complexity 
of the model increases, the complexity of the solution also increases. Clement (18) 
claims that the results obtained from simulation models are often over-emphasized. 
He claims that while very useful inferences can be made from a study of a model, 
it should be kept in mind that the model is only an approximation of the actual system 
and the results should be treated accordingly. Quade (19) discusses the problems 
associated with model development in general, which of course applies to simulation 
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modeling. Specifically, he mentions two aspects of model building that often 
cause problems. These two aspects are quantification and the treatment of 
uncertainty. 
A serious drawback to simulation using Monte Carlo techniques is the 
problem of statistical analysis. Fishman and Kiviat (20) raise several statistical 
questions which are common to all problem analyses and to model structural 
verification and validation as well. One question raised relates to the choice of 
the sampling interval. Another problem is obtaining statistically reliable results 
while avoiding huge sample sizes. Also troublesome is the determination of initial 
conditions and operating ranges for system variables. Thus, it is seen that simu­
lation provides a way to approach some very difficult and complex problems, but 
it also has to be used with an element of caution. 
Previous Studies 
In the initial stage of the literature search, a bibliography search was 
requested from the Defense Documentation Center to obtain a comprehensive review 
of research previously done in the air defense analysis area. Since most study 
conducted on the subject of air defense would probably be performed under govern­
ment direction, this bibliography search resulted in a good survey of the general 
research area. However, since the entire literature search for this study included 
only unclassified sources, one may logically assume that additional research has 
been conducted which is of a classified nature. 
The literature search revealed that considerable effort has been directed 
toward the development of large scale war game models, such as STAGE. As this 
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research was not intended to be a war game, these previous studies had only 
slight bearing on this investigation. 
One of the early attempts at modeling an air defense battle was made by 
Quade (21) in 1949. This attempt made use of a mathematical model based on the 
expected values of individual battle events. The model was not designed for com­
puter simulation as the electronic computer was still in the early stages of 
development. 
Martin (22) describes an analog simulator device created at Johns Hopkins 
University in the early 195O's, which mechanically simulated an air battle between 
two opposing forces. This model was a crude forerunner of some computer simu­
lation models that were developed a short time later. 
Sheppard (23), in a paper presented at a N. A . T .O . sponsored conference 
in 1965, describes a simulation model designated ICS1. This model, programmed 
in FORTRAN II, was designed to simulate the air battle between manned intercep­
tors and manned penetrators. The author describes the use of the model in com­
paring the effectiveness of four interceptors proposed for future U. S. Air Force 
use. At the same conference, Facey (24) presented a general air battle simulation 
model, COMO H. The model was designed to study the effectiveness of various 
weapon systems against low flying aircraft. 
In 1967, Brodheim and Herzer (25) reported on a general dynamic model 
for air defense. The authors report on its application to trade-off problems, 
optimization of offensive strategies, and cost effectiveness studies. 
Many other simulation studies have been made ranging from individual 
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weapon simulation to global nuclear war simulation. The studies thus described 
are representative of those most closely related to this particular investigation. 
Conclusions 
The results of the literature survey show that simulation has wide appli­
cation as a tool in military analysis, although there are some definite limitations 
to the technique. Simulation is readily applicable to the complex combination of 
stochastic processes which describe an air defense problem. 
Simulation has been widely used for a variety of air defense studies in the 
past. Much of this effort has been directed toward large scale game-type simu­
lations. Simulation has not been used previously to determine strategy with regard 
to selection of a defense line location. In fact, little effort has been made in using 
simulation to determine effective strategies at low operational echelons. There­
fore, this research is expected to enlarge the dimensions of study in the area of 




Approach to the Problem 
To accomplish the objectives of this investigation, a specific air defense 
system must be analyzed. Security restrictions, however, force the system to be 
a hypothetical one. The parameters of the system are intended to be realistic but 
are not representative of any actual system or system component. Since this study 
is directed toward the lower operational elements of the defense system, a rela­
tively small interceptor force of 25 aircraft has been created to oppose an attack­
ing bomber force of 75 aircraft. 
With a particular system well defined, it is then possible to formulate a 
set of relationships that describe the interactions among various elements of an 
air defense system. In this case, the description consisted of a flow diagram with 
probability density functions and some constants defining the relationships of the 
parts of the flow diagram. 
After quantifying the problem, a computer simulation model was construc­
ted to represent the overall process. The language chosen for the computer simu­
lation was GPSS n. This language made it relatively simple to transform the flow 
diagram of the air defense system into a computer routine. 
The completed computer simulation model was validated following the pro­
cedure suggested by Meier (26). The model was first run several times in order 
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to detect and eliminate programming and logical errors. When the model appeared 
to be performing satisfactorily, a second stage of validation was begun. The com­
puter program was designed to print out 18 tables of different system character­
istics as well as printing out the values of 15 system variables each time a trans­
action (bomber) was processed by the system. This output made it possible to 
analyze sub-parts of the program to determine if, in fact, the sub-parts were per­
forming as intended. After this stage of validation, the model was run with different 
sets of trial data to insure that the overall result was reasonable. 
The completed simulation model was used to gather data which measured 
the air defense system's performance under predetermined experimental conditions. 
The system was simulated using six different values for defense line location. These 
distances, measured from the bomb release line, were 150 miles through 400 miles 
in 50-mile increments. Replications of the measure of effectiveness for each value 
of the defense line location could be obtained by using a different random number 
seed in the GPSS II program. The data could then be subjected to statistical tests 
to determine if defense line location significantly affected the battle results; and if 
so, to determine which location was best according to the criteria established 
previously. 
System Variables 
All system variables used in this investigation are hypothetical and are not 
intended to be descriptive of any actual system presently in being. However, an 
attempt was made to keep all data realistic, and the values used could be realized 
by existing equipment. 
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Participating aircraft are assumed to have certain flight characteristics. 
The attacking bomber speeds are determined to be either 400 knots (slow speed), 
600 knots (medium speed), or 800 knots (high speed). The interceptor cruise 
speed, or the speed at which the interceptor travels to and from the battle area, 
is set at 400 knots. These aircraft speeds appear reasonable in the light of pre­
sent day aircraft technology. Further, interceptor maximum endurance at cruise 
speed and interceptor armament capacity are fixed at 140 minutes and three firing 
attempts, respectively. The maximum range at which the bomber aircraft are 
detected by the defense is arbitrarily placed at 400 miles. Weapon kill probability 
is fixed at 0.75 for each intercept. 
In addition to these aircraft characteristics, several other components of 
the defense system are best described by probability distributions. In GPSS n, 
these take the form of functions, and specific functional values are generated as 
random variables. One of these is the time required to complete an intercept 
after the interceptor and bomber are initially paired. This function (FUNCTION 
1 in the computer program) is a combination of two other functions (FUNCTION 8 
plus FUNCTION 9). FUNCTION 9 is the normal intercept time function, and 
FUNCTION 8 is a factor added to the normal time when the distance separating 
bomber and interceptor is large enough to necessitate unusual flight time. Figure 2 
shows the density function of the normal intercept time. Figure 3 shows the addi­
tional time element plotted against the distance separating the two aircraft. 
Another important variable is the combat endurance for each interceptor. 
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on a bomber until the time that the interceptor begins its return to base. Figure 4 
shows the density function for the combat endurance factor. This factor is applied 
to that portion of total interceptor endurance which remains after the subtraction 
of the time spent going to and coming from the battle area. It will be noticed that 
the endurance factor is always less than one. This follows the reasoning that the 
interceptor, while in the battle area, cannot use optimum fuel flow power settings, 
and thus can only attain a fraction of the endurance that could be attained at cruis­
ing speeds. 
Figure 5 shows the probability distribution for the interceptor turnaround 
times. Because of differing degrees of re-fueling, re-arming, and maintenance 
requirements for each interceptor, the time required to service an aircraft could 
normally be a random variable. 
Simulation Language Employed 
The computer simulation model for this investigation could have been pro­
grammed in almost any computer language; either a general purpose language such 
as ALGOL or FORTRAN, or one of several special purpose languages. GPSS JJ 
was ultimately chosen because the language is designed to describe a process with 
transactions moving through facilities, storages, and queues. The air defense 
system can be envisioned as such a process with the bombers being transactions 
serviced (intercepted) by facilities which represent the interceptors. A feature 
that makes GPSS II particularly useful in a study such as this is the capability of 
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A brief description of the major elements of the language will be given 
here. A more comprehensive treatment is contained in the GPSS U User Manual 
(27). 
GPSS TJ is a computer programming language that is designed to facili­
tate the simulation and study of complex systems. The language describes a pro­
cess whereby transactions move in time through a system composed essentially of 
facilities, storages, and queues. The use of COMPARE blocks allows a wide range 
of logical decision making processes to be simulated. The program automatically 
compiles and prints out certain statistics regarding facility utilization, storage 
utilization, queue contents, and number of transactions flowing through the blocks 
in the system. In addition, other information can be collected and printed out in 
table form as desired by the user. 
In using GPSS JJ the normal procedure is to prepare a block diagram or 
flow diagram of the process to be studied. This diagram utilizes the block types 
allowed by the language. Block types such as HOLD, SEIZE, RELEASE, QUEUE, 
STORE, COMPARE, and others are usually adequate to describe a given process. 
The block diagram is then readily converted into a computer program by trans­
forming the diagram into punched cards utilizing specified formats. Little, if any, 
formal programming experience is required. 
In the simulation model developed for this study, the blocks HOLD, SEIZE, 
and RELEASE are used to simulate the utilization of a facility (interceptor) by a 
transaction (bomber). When a transaction enters a HOLD block or a SEIZE block, 
the interceptor represented by that particular facility is then considered to be 
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engaged in an attack on that particular bomber. The interceptor remains engaged 
until the transaction exits the HOLD block or enters a RELEASE block, at which 
time the interceptor becomes available for intercept action against another bomber. 
A QUEUE block is utilized to simulate bombers which have penetrated to, or past, 
the defense line but still have not been engaged by an interceptor. Therefore, the 
bombers wait in the QUEUE block until some disposition is made of them. ASSIGN 
blocks are used to give some particular characteristic or identification number to 
transactions. This value is frequently used as a counter to keep a record of cer­
tain events. SAVEX blocks are used to store values in computer memory until 
some later use is necessary. COMPARE blocks are used liberally in the simu­
lation model to simulate logical processes. The COMPARE block only allows a 
transaction to enter that block if the comparison specified is actually satisfied, so 
it acts to control the path of the transaction through the system. ORIGINATE blocks, 
as the name implies, create the transactions for the system. In this case, they 
are used to generate the target force of bombers, the interceptor force, and also 
are used to generate certain miscellaneous transactions that are used to control 
parts of the system. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
General Description 
The computer simulation model will be presented and briefly explained 
in this chapter. It is assumed that the reader has some knowledge of the GPSS E 
simulation language and can interpret the majority of the flow diagrams. Only 
the c r u c i a l b l o c k s will be e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l . The c o m p l e t e c o m p u t e r program 
may be found in Appendix A . 
The simulation model consists of six different sub-models, some of which, 
in turn, are composed of several sub-parts. Figure 6 shows a diagram of the air 
defense system with an input consisting of attacking bombers and an output of either 
neutralized bombers or escaping bombers that have reached the bomb release line. 
As can be seen from the diagram, the system itself is comprised of five sections. 
Three of them actually process bomber transactions and two sections serve only 
as decision-making and control elements. A general description of the function of 
these five sections as well as the Target Generating Section will aid in understanding 
the detailed description of each section which follows later. 
The Target Generating Section, as its name implies, serves the purpose 
of generating the appropriate number of transactions, which then pass to the Pre-
Intercept Section as the input to the air defense system. The Target Generating 
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The Pre-Intercept Section accepts the targets as they enter the air 
defense system (at the defense line) and routes them to the selected interceptor 
for intercept action. This section also determines the priorities that should be 
assigned to each target, depending on its speed and penetration. 
The particular interceptor chosen for assignment to any specific bomber 
is determined by the Interceptor Selection Section. This section receives an input 
(from the Interceptor Availability and Control Section) of which interceptors are 
airborne and have the necessary fuel and armament to be available for intercept 
duty. 
When a bomber transaction has been assigned to an interceptor facility 
for action, the actual intercept phase begins. This occurs in the Intercept Section. 
In this section, the bomber transaction holds the interceptor facility until sufficient 
time has elapsed to complete the intercept. 
At completion of intercept the transaction enters the Post-Intercept Section. 
Here it is determined whether a successful intercept has been accomplished or 
whether the attack failed to neutralize the bomber. If a "no-kill" results, the bom­
ber transaction will recycle through the defense system, provided it has not yet 
reached the bomb release line. 
Specific Sections 
Target Generating Section 
The block diagram of this section is shown in Figure 7. ORIGINATE 
blocks 1, 11, and 26 are used to create transactions which simulate bombers. In 
the final simulation model, additional ORIGINATE blocks were added (blocks 2 and 
F i g u r e 7. D i a g r a m of T a r g e t Generat ing Sect ion. 
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12) but their function is identical to the ones shown, so they were omitted to 
simplify the diagram. ASSIGN blocks 36, 38, and 40 assign the bomber speeds 
to parameter 3 of each transaction. VARIABLES 2, 3, and 4 correspond to tar­
get speeds of 800 knots, 600 knots, and 400 knots, respectively. SAVEX block 44 
and ASSIGN block 46 serve to place a target identification number in parameter 8 
of each target transaction. ASSIGN blocks 48 and 50 set parameters 1 and 2 ini­
tially to a value of one for use later in the system. ASSIGN block 60 places the 
value of VARIABLE 30 in parameter 5. VARIABLE 30 represents the time re­
quired for the bomber to penetrate from the detection line to the defense line. 
The bomber transaction is then held in STORE block 64 until sufficient time has 
elapsed for it to have reached the defense line, where it can then be attacked by 
the interceptor force. Block 76 assigns a constant of 300 to parameter 5 for later 
use in the program. Blocks 66, 68, 70, 72, and 74 serve to keep track of the time 
remaining until a bomber is due at the defense line. That is, each transaction 
entering block 66 adds to SAVEX 120 the time required for the corresponding bom­
ber to reach the defense line. Then, each minute thereafter, one minute is sub­
tracted from the total to achieve a "count-down." This is used later in the Inter­
ceptor Availability and Control Section as part of a decision-making process. 
Pre-Intercept Section 
Targets initially reaching the defense line enter QUEUE 1, block 300, as 
shown in Figure 8. There are five different possibilities for disposition of the 
transaction leaving block 300. COMPARE block 301 accepts those bomber trans­
actions that have already penetrated to within 30 miles of the bomb release line. 
To block 300 
Figure 8. Diagram of Pre-Intercept Section. 
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Figure 8 (Continued). Diagram of Pre-Intercept Section. 
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Since they are that near the bomb release line, it would not be feasible to attempt 
an intercept, so the bomber's time for reaching that point is tabulated in TABLE 
12 (block 308), and TABLE 17 (block 394) records the distance of the bomber 
from the bomb release line, which in this case is zero. 
The network headed by COMPARE block 302 accepts those bombers which 
have penetrated two-thirds of the distance from the defense line to the bomb re­
lease line. These targets are then assigned priorities (blocks 314, 316, 318) 
according to their speed. High speed targets receive highest priority of six, fol­
lowed by medium speed and low speed targets with five and four respectively. 
Block 320 adds a constant to parameter 1 which, being part of VARIABLE 14, 
prevents the transaction from passing through that priority network after its 
return to block 300. 
The network headed by block 303 performs a priority assigning function 
similar to the preceding section, with the difference being that it accepts those 
targets which have penetrated one-third of the distance to the bomb release line. 
Priorities assigned are three, two, and one to high speed, medium speed, and 
low speed targets respectively. 
Before proceeding with a detailed description of the network entered 
through COMPARE block 304, a brief description of the overall function will be 
given. The network accepts bombers which have penetrated more than 50 miles 
past the defense line, and tries first to find an interceptor in approximately the 
same position. Failing in that, it attempts to find any interceptor behind the 
defense line to pair with the bomber. If this also fails, there is no other 
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alternative but to accept any interceptor that is available. 
In more detail, COMPARE blocks 304, 406, 408, and 410 and SAVEX 
blocks 412, 438, 436, and 434 all serve to place in SAVEX location 170 a zone 
number for the location of the bomber. For example, if the bomber has pene­
trated from 50 to 150 miles past the defense line, the constant one is placed in 
SAVEX 170 (signifying that the approximate location of the bomber is 100 miles 
past the defense line). Blocks 414, 416, 418, 420, and 422, in conjunction with 
the COMPARE block 424, constitute a search procedure through the SAVEX loca­
tions 301, 302 325. These SAVEX locations are used in other parts of the 
program to keep a record of each interceptor1 s location, using the same zone 
notation. If the search produces an interceptor with the same zone location as 
the target, the transaction passes through COMPARE block 424. Blocks 424, 
428, 430, and 432 serve to pair the target with the appropriate interceptor by 
placing the interceptor identification number in parameter 4. Then, if that inter­
ceptor facility is not in use, the transaction is sent to block 337 in the Intercept 
Section where the intercept action will take place. Blocks 37 and 741 are involved 
only if the interceptor is in use and cannot be paired with the bomber. SAVEX 
block 37 sets the interceptor zone number to zero (all engaged or otherwise 
unavailable interceptors should always have zero in the zone SAVEX location). 
ASSIGN block 741 re-assigns the value 300 to parameter 5 and the transaction is 
returned to QUEUE 1 (block 300) for further disposition. 
Block 440 is entered if the search to find an interceptor in the same zone 
proves fruitless. Blocks 440, 442, 444, 446, 448, and COMPARE block 452 
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again perform a search of interceptor zone SAVEX locations, but this time any 
interceptor located behind the defense line is accepted. If any such interceptor 
is found, the transaction goes to block 426 and repeats the procedure previously 
described. 
If no interceptor is found behind the defense line, then the transaction 
enters ASSIGN block 454 which returns parameter 5 to a value of 300. If COM­
PARE block 455 accepts the transaction, this means that an interceptor has just 
become airborne and has not yet reached the defense line, but is available for 
action behind the line. The transaction then passes through blocks 457, 459, 461, 
458, 460, and 52 which serve to pair the interceptor with that target by assign­
ing the interceptor identification number to parameter 4 of the target transaction. 
The target then proceeds to block 335 in the Intercept Section. 
ADVANCE block 463 accepts target transactions which were unable to 
find an available interceptor anywhere behind the line. An attempt is first made 
to send the transaction to block 305 (to an interceptor at the defense line) and if 
unable to go to block 305, the transaction is delayed for one minute at block 456, 
and then returned to block 300 to repeat the search cycle. 
Intercept Section 
The Intercept Section, shown in Figure 9, begins with GATE block 305 
which accepts transactions only if logic switch 1 is set. This means that theL 
Interceptor Selection Section has selected an available interceptor to engage the 
target and has stored the interceptor identification number in SAVEX location 200. 
ASSIGN block 334 then places the interceptor identification number in parameter 4 
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From block 300 
To block 373 
Figure 9. Diagram of Intercept Section. 
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F i g u r e 9 (Continued). D i a g r a m of Intercept Sect ion. 
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of the target. Then in ASSIGN block 335, the same identification number is added 
to parameter 5 (previously carrying a value of 300) so that parameter 5 now con­
tains the interceptor zone SAVEX number (the appropriate 300 series SAVEX 
location). Block 337 assigns the value found in the zone SAVEX to parameter 6, 
where it is later considered in computing the intercept action time. Block 338 
accepts those transactions that have penetrated too deeply for the assigned inter­
ceptor to overtake. The transaction is delayed one minute in block 338, the value 
300 is restored to parameter 5 in block 741, and the transaction is returned to 
block 300. 
Targets that are not removed from the Intercept Section via block 338 
will proceed to ADVANCE block 80 which, with COMPARE block 82, verifies 
that the interceptor has armament remaining and can accomplish the intercept. 
ASSIGN block 336 stores in parameter 7 the total number of attempts made on 
each target. Blocks 342 through 353 were SAVEX blocks used in program trouble­
shooting and have no functional effect on the model. LOGIC block 362 resets logic 
switch 1 to signal the Interceptor Selection Section to select another interceptor 
for the next target. PRINT block 364 was used in trouble-shooting and was by­
passed in the completed program. When the target transaction enters block 366, 
it seizes the facility representing the assigned interceptor. ASSIGN block 368 
adds 100 to the interceptor identification number in parameter 4 so that utilization 
statistics will be kept for facilities numbered 100, 101, . . . , 125. The time 
required to complete the intercept is assigned to parameter 5, and the transaction 
is delayed in block 373 until either the bomber reaches the bomb release line 
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(COMPARE block 365), or the intercept is completed (COMPARE block 377). 
Targets that reach the bomb release line pass through blocks 375, 379, and 381 
and release the facility in block 383. SPLIT block 51 sends one transaction 
through block 53 to block 641, where it is used in recording the interceptor's 
zone. The other transaction goes to block 308 in the Pre-Intercept Section where 
the bomb release time is tabulated. 
Completed intercepts (block 377) pass through block 49 to TABULATE 
block 374 which tabulates the time required to complete the intercept. The trans­
action passes through blocks 385 and 376 to block 378, where the expenditure of 
an interceptor weapon is recorded in the appropriate SAVEX location. The trans­
action then enters the Post-Intercept Section. 
Post-Intercept Section 
This section is composed of one program segment which determines the 
outcome of the intercept, and a second segment which keeps a record of the inter­
ceptor's location after the intercept. The diagram is shown in Figure 10. 
Targets passing from block 378 in the Intercept Section enter block 380 
which releases the engaged interceptor. Block 630 adds 300 to the interceptor 
identification number stored in parameter 4 of the target. This gives parameter 
4 the interceptor zone SAVEX number ( the 300 series SAVEX locations). SPLIT 
block 631 sends one transaction to block 641 in the network which maintains the 
interceptor's location, and the other transaction passes to block 632 in the net­
work which determines the outcome of the intercept. 
Block 641 causes logic switch 5 to be set so that the Interceptor Selection 
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Figure 10. Diagram of Post-Intercept Section. 
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Figure 10 (Continued). Diagram of Post-Intercept Section. 
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Section will not be activated until both the transactions produced by SPLIT block 
631 have been processed. Blocks 642, 643, 644, 645, 654, 655, and 656 act to 
place the appropriate zone location for the interceptor, at the termination of 
intercept, in SAVEX location 175. Block 647 resets the logic switch correspond­
ing to the interceptor zone SAVEX number. This action indicates to the Inter­
ceptor Availability and Control Section that the interceptor is being given a new 
zone location number. The transaction passes through block 54 to block 649, 
where the subtraction of 300 from parameter 4 causes the interceptor identifi­
cation number to be restored to that parameter. The transaction holds at block 
649 until the interceptor is seized again (GATE block 650), either by intercept 
action or return to base, or until enough time has elapsed to enable the inter­
ceptor to move one zone nearer to the defense line (COMPARE block 657). As 
soon as the interceptor is utilized again, the zone location number is set to zero 
(blocks 651 and 652). Blocks 658, 659, 660, 661, and 662 decrease the zone 
location number by one when the interceptor has had enough time to traverse 100 
miles. 
The transaction going from SPLIT block 631 to ADVANCE block 632 
determines the outcome of the intercept. The departure from block 632 is routed 
by FUNCTION 2 which randomly sends 75 percent of the transactions to block 633 
(kill) and 25 percent of the transactions to block 398 (no-kill). The values of 
FUNCTION 2 correspond to the kill probability of the interceptor weapon. 
If the target is destroyed (block 633), the transaction passes through 
block 670, which allows the Interceptor Selection Section to be re-activated, and 
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then through TABULATE blocks 384 and 386, which record the number of kills 
per interceptor and the time of kill. Blocks 388, 390, and 392 were used for 
trouble-shooting. In the final program, all kills pass through blocks 396 and 
394 which assign and record the kill distance from the bomb release line. 
Targets that are not killed go to block 398 which tabulates the number 
of no-kills on each target. The transaction passes through block 671 and block 
634 and then through block 635, only if the target distance from the bomb release 
line is greater than 30 miles. If the distance is less than 30 miles, the trans­
action passes to block 306 in the Pre-Intercept Section, where bomb release 
information is recorded. Targets still subject to intercept pass through block 
635, through block 636 which de-activates the Interceptor Selection Section, 
through BUFFER block 637, and to either block 638 or 640. Blocks 638, 639, 
737, and 739 allow the target to be re-engaged by the same interceptor for an­
other attempt, and the transaction returns to block 337 in the Intercept Section. 
Blocks 640 and 741 allow the target transaction to return to QUEUE 1 because 
the interceptor from the prior attempt is no longer available. 
Interceptor Selection Section 
This section, diagrammed in Figure 11, performs the function of 
searching through the interceptors until one is found that is available for duty. 
That interceptor identification number is then stored in SAVEX location 200, and 
the Pre-Intercept Section is signaled that an interceptor has been selected. The 
selection method used provides a fairly uniform utilization of interceptors; but 
not completely uniform, which would be unrealistic. In an actual battle, a 
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Figure 11. Diagram of Interceptor Selection Section. 
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Figure 11 (Continued). Diagram of Interceptor Selection Section. 
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commander could not expect to position the interceptors so that the intercept 
attempts would be uniformly distributed. Nevertheless, wise deployment of 
forces would lead to an approximation of the desired even distribution. 
ORIGINATE block 700 creates a single transaction at the beginning of 
the program. This is a "dummy" transaction in that it remains within this 
particular section, continually re-cycling during the simulation process, to 
control events taking place in other sections. 
ASSIGN block 702 delays the transaction until time for the interceptors 
to begin battle (VARIABLE 35). Block 708 gives the control transaction a choice 
of passing to block 710, where a search is made in ascending order through the 
interceptor identification numbers; or to block 726, where the search is made in 
descending order. Blocks 710, 712, and 714 perform a search function by adding 
one to the interceptor identification number until an available interceptor is found, 
or until the search has been completed through the highest numbered interceptor 
in the system. When an interceptor is found (block 714), the control transaction 
passes through blocks 716, 718, 720, and 722 and is delayed at GATE block 724 
until signaled by the Intercept Section that another search and selection is required. 
If the search is fruitless, the transaction would go from block 710 to block 730. If 
the search was a complete search of all interceptors, then the transaction passes 
through block 732 and block 734 and delays at block 736 for one minute before 
starting another search. 
Blocks 726, 728, 744, 746, 748, 750, and 752 perform similar search 
functions to the procedure just described except the search is done in descending 
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order. 
Interceptor Availability and Control Section 
The simulation model is directed from this section. It determines take­
off times, landing times, combat times, interceptor availability, and makes logi­
cal decisions (according to programmed instructions) during the course of the 
battle. For ease of diagramming and description, this section will be sub-divided 
into seven sub-parts for discussion. 
Sub-Section I. Figure 12 describes this network which originates the 
transactions that simulate the interceptor force. ORIGINATE block 500 origi­
nates a single transaction at the beginning of the simulation. Block 502 assigns 
the total number of interceptors (VARIABLE 6) to parameter 1. Blocks 504, 506, 
508, 510, and 512 cause the initial transaction to split into the same number of 
transactions as there are interceptors. Each transaction is assigned an inter­
ceptor identification number in parameter 2 (ASSIGN block 510). Block 514 
assigns VARIABLE 16, the time required for an interceptor to reach the defense 
line, to parameter 4. In blocks 516 and 518, VARIABLE 9 (the initial take-off 
time) is assigned to parameter 5 and all interceptors are seized until take-off 
time. From block 518, the transactions go either to block 520 in Sub-Section II 
or to block 578 in Sub-Section VTI. 
Sub-Section II. This section, shown in Figure 13, allows the interceptor 
force to take-off. Block 520, in conjunction with SAVEX block 522, allows the 
initial manning force to pass after release from Sub-Section I. Block 524 zeroes 
the flight time at take-off. SAVEX location 117 (block 526) records the total 
500 
block £20 To block 578 
Figure 12. Sub-Section I 
Interceptor Availability and Control Section. 
From block 5l8 
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Figure 13. Sub-Section II 
Interceptor Availability and Control Section. 
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number of interceptors committed to the battle. ASSIGN block 528 assigns the 
combat endurance factor to parameter 3. TABULATE blocks 520 and 532 record 
the number of sorties per interceptor and the take-off times. SAVEX block 534 
sets the weapon expenditure counter initially to one. At block 537, the intercep­
tor is delayed for five minutes, which simulates the time required to become 
airborne and established on course to the battle area. From block 537, the trans­
action can go either to block 541 in Sub-Section in, or to block 539, where it is 
delayed until reaching the defense line. After the delay it passes through block 
539 to block 538 in Sub-Section IV. 
Sub-Section LTI. The network diagrammed in Figure 14 is involved when 
a newly airborne interceptor is required to intercept a bomber that has penetrated 
past the defense line. GATE block 541 is a signal from the Pre-Intercept Section 
that the interceptor is required immediately for assignment. ASSIGN block 543 
places the interceptor's zone location in parameter 4 and later, SAVEX block 549 
places the zone location number in the appropriate SAVEX location. SAVEX block 
545 provides a means of notifying the Pre-Intercept Section which interceptor is 
available. SPLIT block 553 and blocks 557, 620, 621, 622, and 623 send a trans­
action to the section which maintains zone location information. The original 
interceptor transaction passes through ASSIGN block 555 to block 538 in Sub-
Section IV. 
Sub-Section IV. Figure 15 illustrates this portion of the Interceptor 
Availability and Control Section. This sub-section releases the interceptor for 
intercept duty (block 538). TABULATE block 540 records the time the interceptor 
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Figure 14. Sub-Section HI 
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Interceptor Availability and Control Section, 
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became available for action. SAVEX location 115 (block 544) records the number 
of interceptors in action. Block 41 simulates the interceptor being paired with 
a bomber, and block 542 marks parameter 1 to start recording combat endurance. 
A transaction passing through block 43 symbolizes an interceptor that has never 
been utilized but which has no more time available at the defense line. ASSIGN 
block 45 assigns the total remaining interceptor airborne time (VARIABLE 18) 
to parameter 3. 
When the interceptor nears the end of its endurance (VARIABLE 19), 
block 546 allows passage to block 606, unless there are already surplus inter­
ceptors airborne (block 548). Block 606 provides a signal to Sub-Section VH that 
a replacement interceptor is needed. Similarly, blocks 602 and 604 allow a sig­
nal for replacement if the interceptor has only one weapon left and is in the pro­
cess of using it. Blocks 559 and 561 assign the intercept zone SAVEX location 
to parameter 8, and the transaction passes to block 78 in Sub-Section V. 
Sub-Section V. GATE block 78, in Figure 16, allows the interceptor 
transaction to pass as soon as any intercept in progress has been completed. 
Block 563 assigns the interceptor zone to parameter 7. Blocks 88, 90, 92, 94, 
96, 93, and 95 assign the time required to return to base from the present inter­
ceptor location. Since the interceptor location is only approximate because of the 
zone system, VARIABLES 45, 46, and 47 are used to randomly add or subtract 
some increment of time from the time required to return to base. 
The transaction remains at block 565 until either the interceptor moves 
from one zone to another (block 613); or the interceptor endurance is exhausted 
Figure 16. Sub-Section V 
Interceptor Availability and Control Section. 
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(block 614); or the interceptor armament is expended (block 615). Block 613 
lets the transaction re-cycle and receive a new return-to-base time when the 
interceptor zone location changes. Blocks 614 and 615 let the transaction pass 
through block 550 to block 552 in Sub-Section VI. 
Sub-Section VI. This section simulates the interceptor leaving the battle 
area and returning to the interceptor base. The block diagram is shown in 
Figure 17. SEIZE block 552 places the interceptor facility in an unavailable 
status. TABULATE blocks 554, 558, 564, 568, and 570 record respectively the 
combat time per interceptor, the time departing the battle area, the time required 
to return to base, weapon expenditure, and flight time per interceptor. SAVEX 
block 556 subtracts one from the total of interceptors committed to battle. SAVEX 
block 560 subtracts one from the total of interceptors available for action, and 
also holds the transaction for the time required to return to base. Block 572 then 
marks parameter 8 for further use in recording turnaround times and the trans­
action passes to Sub-Section VTI. 
Sub-Section VII. Figure 18 illustrates the section which simulates the 
interceptor servicing and delay on the ground pending subsequent return to battle. 
ADVANCE block 574 holds the transaction until the service and turnaround time 
requirements are met (FUNCTION 6), Some transactions are then routed by 
FUNCTION 7 to blocks 610 and 612, which simulate permanent loss of an inter­
ceptor; and the interceptor identification number and time of loss are tabulated. 
All other transactions go to block 576 which tabulates turnaround times. ADVANCE 
block 578 holds the interceptor transactions until either a signal for a replacement 
Figure 17. Sub-Section VI 
Interceptor Availability and Control Section. 
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Figure 18. Sub-Section VII 
Interceptor Availability and Control Section. 
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interceptor is received (block 586), or the arriving bomber force is too large 
for the available interceptor force (block 587), or three or more bombers are 
subject to being intercepted and no interceptors are available (block 388). In 
the first and last case above, the interceptor transaction is returned to block 
524 in Sub-Section I for take-off. Blocks 592, 594, 596, 598, and 600 allow 
the interceptor to take-off (through block 600 to block 528) unless the attacking 
bomber force is still too far away from the defense line. In that case, block 596 





To satisfy the objectives of this investigation, two experiments were 
performed. Each experiment consisted of repeated simulations of the air defense 
system to provide combat results for six pre-determined defense line locations. 
The analysis of variance was used to test for a significant difference in results 
obtained at these locations. The experimental design employed was a completely 
randomized single factor design with six treatment levels (defense line location) 
and 36 replications for each level. This yielded 216 observations for each experi­
ment. Replications were obtained by changing the random number seed in the 
GPSS H program for successive simulation trials. Each simulation provided data 
in the form of the average number of bomber escapees and the average bomber 
neutralization distance from the bomb release line for each treatment level. The 
data concerning average number of escapees were subjected to a one-way analysis 
of variance to test the hypothesis that treatment effects were zero. 
The two experiments differed only in the intercept time function. In the 
second experiment, the mean of the intercept density function was increased to 
study the sensitivity of the optimal defense line location to the intercept time func­
tion. The effect of changing the intercept time function would be analogous to an 
air defense system suffering more degradation during a battle than anticipated. 
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Factors such as heavy enemy electronic countermeasures, or even unfavorable 
weather conditions, could cause this decreased effectiveness. 
The Initial Experiment 
In this experiment, the intercept time function, previously shown in 
Figure 2, has a mean of 6.25 minutes and a range from 3. 0 minutes to 10.0 
minutes. The air defense system was simulated at six different defense line 
locations. The six values selected were 150 miles, 200 miles, 250 miles, 300 
miles, 350 miles, and 400 miles. All distances were measured from the bomb 
release line. A value less than 150 miles was not considered, as it is likely that 
any lesser value would allow time for only one intercept attempt on each bomber. 
Thus, all "no-kills" would be almost certain escapees. On the other hand, 400 
miles was the maximum value tested, as a defense line of 450 miles could not 
have been reached by the interceptor force with maximum endurance of 140 
minutes at a speed of 400 knots. 
The experiment yielded the results shown in Table 1. These data were 
obtained by averaging all 36 replications at each treatment level. Complete results 
are shown in Appendix B. Table 1 shows that the lowest average number of escapees 
was allowed when the defense line was at a distance of 250 miles from the bomb re­
lease line. Figure 19 shows the average number of escapees and the average 
neutralization distance plotted as a function of defense line location. It is observed 
that the average kill distance increases almost linearly as the defense line changes 
from 150 to 250 miles. The rate of increase in the kill distance drops off sharply 
as the defense line increases beyond the 250 mile distance. 
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Table 1. Results of First Experiment 
Defense Line Location 
150 200 250 300 350 I4OO 
Average Number 
of Escapees 9.19 U.53 2.17 3 .17 3.U2 U.00 
Average Bomber 
K i l l Distance 70.56 113.86 155.U7 181.01 202.52 206.93 
Figure 19. Graph of Results of First Experiment. 
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A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to determine if defense 
line location had a significant effect on system performance as measured by the 
number of escaping bombers allowed. Stated more rigorously, the hypotheses 
were 
HQ: T = 0; j = 1, 2 6 
H : Above not true 
th 
where T. is the j treatment effect. The results of the analysis of variance are 
J 
shown in Table 2 . The test statistic is highly significant and leads to the 
Table 2 . ANOVA Table for First Experiment 
Source of Degrees of Sum of Mean V 
Variation Freedom Squares Square V 
Between 
Treatments 5 1102.97 220.59 3U.U1 * 
Error 210 13U5.36 6.U1 
Totals 215 210.8.33 
* Significant at the .05 level 
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rejection of the null hypothesis. One comment should be injected here concern­
ing the assumptions underlying the analysis of variance. The procedure assumes 
homogeneous error variances, and in this experiment it is likely that this assump-
t 
tion was violated. However, Sheffe (28) points out that the significance level is 
only slightly affected in the one-way classification as long as the number of obser­
vations is large and equal for all treatment levels. Such is the case in this 
experiment. 
After performing the analysis of variance, further investigation was 
undertaken to determine if the minimum number of escapees, 2.17, differed signifi­
cantly from the other five treatment means. Since this test was conducted after 
the analysis of variance, there exists some chance of affecting the significance 
level of the test. Hicks (29) suggests that Duncan's Multiple Range test be used 
in such circumstances. The results of this test are shown in Table 3. The test 
in its entirety involves the comparison of all possible combinations of treatment 
means, but in this case, the only comparisons of interest are those between the 
"optimum" mean and the other five treatment means. The minimum value of 2.17 
escapees differs significantly from all other means except that of 3.17, as shown 
in Table 3. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
A second experiment was conducted to study the sensitivity of the optimal 
defense line location to the time required to complete an intercept. In this experi­
ment, the mean of the intercept time function was increased to 9.20 with a range 
from 3. 0 minutes to 14. 0 minutes. A comparison of the intercept time function 
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Average Number Difference Duncan's Signif icant 
of Escapees in Range 
Compared Means Value 
250 vs 150 2.17 vs 9.19 7.02 * 1.3371. 
250 vs 200 2.17 vs .U.53 2.36 * 1.3121 
250 vs 300 2.17 vs 3.17 1.00 1.1771 
250 vs 350 2.17 vs 3.U2 1.25 * 1.2U03 
250 vs ilOO 2.17 vs I4.OO 1.83 * 1.2825 
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Required to Complete an Intercept 
1U 
Figure 20. Intercept Time Functions for First and Second Experiments. 
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used in the first experiment with the function used in the second experiment is 
shown in Figure 20. Experimental design and analysis, as well as treatment 
levels, remained the same for both experiments. The average number of escapees 
and the average neutralization distance for the six treatment levels is shown in 
Table 4. Figure 21 shows the neutralization distance plotted against the defense 
line location. In this experiment, the air defense forces were most effective at 
destroying the attacking force when the defense perimeter was situated at 350 
miles. Such a configuration resulted in an average of 5.83 escaping bombers. 
An analysis of variance, conducted on the mean number of escapees at 
each treatment level, led to the rejection of the null hypothesis that treatment 
effects were zero (Table 5). Duncan's Multiple Range test showed (Table 6) that 
Table 4. Results of Second Experiment 
Defense Line Location 
150 200 250 300 350 U00 
Average Number 
of Escapee6 20.U. 13.U2 8.89 8.79 5.83 7.U2 
Average Bomber 
Kill Distance UU.U7 78.U7 112 .17 138.9U 168.U5 177.65 
Figure 21. Graph of Results of Second Experiment. 
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TREATMENTS 5 5173.87 103U.77 76.99 • 
ERROR 210 2823.17 13.UU 
TOTALS 215 7997.Oh 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Table 6. Comparison of Means for Second Experiment 
Defense Line Average Number 
Locations of Escapees 
Compared Compared 
350 vs 150 5.83 vs 20. 
350 vs 200 5.83 vs 13 . U2 
350 vs 250 5.83 vs 8.89 
350 vs 300 5.83 vs 8.79 
350 vs U00 5.83 vs 7.U2 





1U.61 « 1.9372 
7.59 1.9005 
3.06 1.8577 
2.96 * 1.7966 
1.59 1.7050 
* Significant at .05 level 
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the minimum number of escapees, 5.83, differed significantly from all other 
treatment means except that of 7.42. 
Discussion of Results 
In both experiments, the position of the defense line is shown to have an 
effect on the system performance. In each case, a defense line location was deter­
mined that minimized (at least for the alternatives considered) the number of es­
caping enemy bombers. In the first experiment the minimum of 2.17 escapees 
was obtained for a defense perimeter of 250 miles. The next lowest value of 3.17 
escapees occurred for a defense line distance of 300 miles and did not differ sig­
nificantly from 2.17. This lack of statistical significance probably means that 
the region containing the optimum is reasonably flat. That is a characteristic of 
many operations research problems. The second experiment also had two values 
for the lowest average number of escapees which were not significantly different. 
The minimum, 5.83, occurred for a defense line distance of 350 miles, and 7.42 
escapees resulted with the defense line located at 400 miles. 
Comparing the two experiments, it is seen that increasing the mean and 
variance of the intercept time function in the second experiment caused the defense 
line position for minimum number of escapees to shift from 250 miles to 350 miles. 
Also, the average number of escaping bombers increased from 2.17 to 5.83. There 
is a trade-off between extending the defense perimeter, which allows more time 
for re-attacks, and retracting the perimeter, which decreases the nonproductive 
interceptor time spent shuttling between the interceptor base and the defense line. 
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When the intercept time function was increased in the second experiment, it 
necessitated extending the defense perimeter to allow more time for re-attacks, 
but this in turn resulted in less efficient utilization of interceptor combat time, 
as evidenced by the higher number of escapees. 
The results of this analysis illustrate a point discussed by Hitch and 
McKean (30). They mention the difficulty of arriving at exact solutions to mili­
tary problems because of "incommensurables." Incommensurables are defined 
as quantitative criteria which cannot readily be translated into a common denomi­
nator. For example, in the first experiment, the minimum number of escaping 
bombers was 2.17. The next lowest figure was 3.17. Statistical analysis showed 
that these values do not differ significantly. In such circumstances, a military 
commander might well decide to accept the 3.17 average number of escapees in 
order to increase the average bomber neutralization distance by approximately 
25 miles. The average kill distance and the average number of escapees are two 
incommensurables, and some qualitative judgment must be made as to the rela­
tive importance of each. The air defense commander must make the final decision, 
based on his personal experience, his intuition, and his evaluation of the situation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
General Comments 
The specific air defense system modeled was a hypothetical system and 
its parameters were somewhat arbitrarily assigned. The results obtained from 
the simulation trials are, strictly speaking, applicable only to the specific system 
modeled. Any attempt to draw general conclusions from this study must take this 
fact into consideration. 
The system did not have all the components that would normally comprise 
most air defense systems. Such factors as the inclusion of surface-to-air missiles 
could significantly alter the relationships of system elements. The conclusions, 
then, should be read in the light of these factors. 
Conclusions 
1. The simulation model developed in this study is a realistic model for 
studying defense system response under a variety of conditions. The model is 
very flexible and can easily be adapted to a wide range of air defense situations. 
2 . An air defense system can be structured as a production-type process 
utilizing queues, facilities, and stores to represent system components. 
3 . GPSS H is an appropriate simulation language for modeling this type 
of system. The ease of programming and the automatic statistic gathering features 
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are some of the language's assets. 
4. For the specific situation simulated, the defense line location has a 
significant effect on the performance of the air defense system. 
5. The information gathered from this research indicates that, for a 
given set of conditions, there exists some optimum position at which the air de­
fense commander should strive to deploy his interceptors for action against 
attacking bombers. 
6. The study also indicates that the defense battle line is sensitive to 
at least one specific system parameter, the intercept time function. Presumably 
other parameters would also have some effect. 
7. The performance of the simulated air defense system shows a sub­
stantial amount of random variation, particularly when the system is not operat­
ing near the best defense line location. Thus, statistical evaluation of an air 
defense system, using few replications, can easily be misleading. 
8. From the limited information gained concerning the importance of 
the intercept time parameter on defense strategy, if intercept times during a 
battle are longer than anticipated, the best strategy would be to extend the defense 
perimeter. This contradicts the natural tendency to withdraw when the tide of 
battle is against the defense. 
Recommendations 
1. This study should be extended to other elements of the air defense 
system. More realistic results could be obtained if missiles and dynamic bomb 
damage were included in the model. 
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2. More sensitivity analysis should be undertaken to identify those 
system parameters that have the greatest effect on the optimum location of the 
defense line. It seems possible that some fairly simple relationship exists be­
tween the defense line distance and a few other major parameters. 
3. More effort should be directed toward optimizing other elements of 
the system. The results obtained from this research indicate that additional 
system optimization studies should be made. 
4. An attempt should be made to verify the results obtained from this 
simulation model by utilizing actual data. If that is not possible, it might be 
profitable to see if another, possibly more complex, simulation model would 
yield approximately the same results as obtained with this model. 
5. In view of conclusion seven, it is recommended that evaluation teams 
give very little scoring emphasis to the number of escapees allowed in a single air 
defense evaluation exercise. 
A P P E N D I X A 
C O M P U T E R PROGRAM 
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COMPUTER PROGRAM 
1 FUNCTION V33 C2 TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE AN INTERCEPT 
3 3 2U 2h 
2 FUNCTION RN1 D2 WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS (633 KILL/398 NO KILL) 
.75 633 1.0 398 
FUNCTION RN1 06 COMBAT ENDURANCE FACTOR 
.0 U .2 8 .5 12 .8 .6 .9 17 1.0 18 
6 FUNCTION RN1 C6 TURNAROUND TIME 
.0 5 .3 8 .5 12 .8 16 .y 20 1.0 30 
7 FUNCTION RNl D2 INTERCEPTOR LOSS RATE (610 LOSS) 
.9 ?7:> 1.0 610 
8 FUNCTION V38 C6 INCREMENT ADDED TO NORMAL INTERCEPT TIME 
-200 15 -IOC 7 -30 0 50 0 200 5 hoo 10 
Q FUNCTION RNl 06 NORMAL INTERCEPT TIME 
.6 3 .1 5 .3 8 .6 10 .9 13 1.0 1U 
10 FUNCTION RNl C2 
.0 0 1.0 10 
1 VARIABLE K200 DEFENSE LINE DISTANCE 
2 VARIABLE K600 HI SPD TGT 
3 VARIABLE K600 MED bPD TGT 
li VARIABLE KiiOO LO bPD TGT 
5 VARIABLE KiiOO INTERCEPTOR CRUISE SPD 





K10 NUMBER DESIRED AIRBORNE 
K3 WEAPON CAPACITY 
AT ONE ; TIME 
9 VARIABLE K75*V20*K60/V2-V1*K60/V2-V23-V16 
10 VARIABLE K3/K2 
11 VARIABLE Ml*P3/lK>0 
13 VARIABLE V20*K60/P3-K30»K60/P3 
1U VARIABLE Pl*V20*K6o/P3-Vl/K3*K6o/P3 
15 VARIABLE P2*V20*K60/P3-V1*K2/K3*K60/P3 
16 VARIABLE V1*K60/V5 
17 VARIABLE Kll.0 
16 VARIABLE V17*P3/K20-Ml*P3/K2O-Vl6*P3/K20*Vl6 
19 VARIABLE V18-K2*V16 
20 VARIABLE KiiOO 
21 VARIABLE Vl8-Vl6.P7*K10O*K6o/V5 
22 VARIABLE Vl6#FN5 
23 VARIABLE K5 
2U VARIABLE -V16-V23+K60/V3«V20-K60/V3*V1 
25 VARIABLE 1117*710-01 
26 VARIABLE I120/V27-V23 
27 VARIABLE S14K1 
28 VARIABLE Kl*rf536 
3C VARIABLE V20*K60/P3-V1*K60/P3 
31 VARIABLE V20-V11 
32 VARIABLE V1UV1-V20 
33 VARIABLE FN8+FN9 
3U VARIABLE V37+Vb7*VliIi-Xl8l*F!6*Viiii*Xl80+VU5 
35 VARIABLE V9+V16 
36 VARIABLE . K100»K60/V5 
37 VARIABLE V16-P7*K100*K60/V5 
38 VARIABLE P6#K100-V32 
39 VARIABLE -V38 
ho VARIABLE vmAioo 
hi VARIABLE VI-MI*V5/K6O+K5O 
h2 VARIABLE PU-Kl 
ii3 VARIABLE V17-V16 
Ul VARIABLE V36/K.2 
VARIABLE V37»FN10/KlO*Vlili»FNlC/KlO.K3 
U6 VARIABLE V37+FNlO»VUi/K10+K3 
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30  1 CAPACITY 200 68 66 SAVEX 120+ P5 68 ASSIGN 5+ 
Kl 70 






7U SAVEX 120- Kl 
70 * * 
* 
START OF PRE-INTERCEPT SECTION 
* 
30  
QUEUE 1 ALL 301 305 301 COMPARE Ml GE V13 306 302 COMPARE Ml GE viU 
ALL 310 312 
303 
COMPARE Ml GE V15 ALL 322 
32U 30U COMPARE V32 G k5o 
BOTH U06 
U3U Uo6 
COMPARE V32 G K150 BOTH 
Uo8 U36 U08 
COMPARE V32 G K250 BOTH 
iao U38 UlO COMPARE 732 G K35o 
1*12 
1*12 SAVEX 170 kU 


























U p5 U28 U28 





U32 37 37 SAVEX *5 
KO 
7U1 U32 GATE NU*U 37 U3U 
SAVEX 170 Kl 
Ul  U36 
SAVEX 170 K2 
Ul  U38 
SAVEX 170 K3 













U8 U5U hhB ASSIGN 5+ 
Kl BOTH 









ADVANCE 300 l 
U58 
COMPARE X172 G KO 
U60 U60 
ASSIGN U X172 
52 52 
SAVEX 172 KO 
35 U5 
COMPARE W537 0 KO 
U57 U57 
LOGIC 
sU U59 U59 
BUFFER 
U61 1*61 
LOGIC RU BOTH 




305 GATE LSI 33U 
33U ASSIGN U X200 335 335 ASSIGN 5+ PU 337 337 ASSIGN 6 x*5 BOTH 338 80 336 COMPARE V39 G V31 300 
80 ADVANCE BOTH 82 336 82 COMPARE X*U G V8 8U 8U BUFFER 7U1 
336 ASSIGN 7+ Kl 3U2 3U2 SAVEX 201 P8 3UU 
3i.U SAVEX 202 V31 3U6 jU6 SAVEX 203 P3 3U8 
3/48 SAVEX 20U CI 350 
350 SA'/SX 205 P7 352 352 SAVEX 206 PU 35U 
35U SAVEX 207 P6 356 356 SAVEX 208 01 358 358 SAVEX 209+ Kl 361 
361 SAVEX 210 x*5 359 359 SAVEX 211 P5 357 357 SAVEX 212 P2 355 
355 SAVEX 213 X115 353 
353 SAVEX 2LU W585 362 362 LOGIC Rl BOTH 366 86 86 ADVANCE 7U1 
36U PRINT 200 • 21U 366 366 SEIZE *U 368 
368 ASSIGN u+ K100 370 370 MARK 2 372 
372 ASSIGN 5 FNl U7 
U7 MARK 1 373 
373 HOLD *U BOTH 375 377 
375 COMPARE V31 LE KO 379 377 COMPARE MPl GE P5 U9 
U9 ASSIGN 1 Kl 37U 
379 SAVEX 150+ Kl 381 
381 ASSIGN U- K100 383 3«3 RELEASE «k 51 
51 SPLIT 53 308 
53 ASSIGN 14+ K300 6U1 
37U TABULATE 13 385 385 ASSIGN 2 Kl 376 376 ASSIGN u- K100 378 378 
* 
SAVEX *u+ Kl 380 
* 
i 
START OF POST-INTERCEPT SECTION 
380 RELEASE •U 630 
630 ASSIGN U+ K300 631 631 SPLIT 614 632 
632 ADVANCE FN 2 633 ASSIGN U- K300 670 670 LOGIC R5 38U 63U ASSIGN U- K300 BOTH 635 306 
635 COMPARE V31 G K30 636 636 LOGIC S5 637 
637 BUFFER BOTH 638 6U0 638 GATE NU*U 639 
639 L< GIC R5 737 737 ASSIGN 5 K300 739 
739 ASSIGN 5+ PU 337 6U0 LOGIC H5 714 
71a ASSIGN 5 K300 300 6Ul LOGIC s5 BOTH 6U2 652 
6U2 COMPARE V32 G K50 BOTH 6U3 65U 6U3 COMPARE V32 G K150 BOTH 6UU 655 
6UU COMPARE V32 G K250 BOTH 6U5 656 
6U5 COMPARE V32 G K350 6U6 6U6 SAVEX 175 KU 6U7 
« START OF INTERCEPT SECTION 
6U7 LOGIC R«U 6U8 
6U8 SAVEX *U XI75 5U 
5U MARK 1 6U9 
6U9 ASSIGN u- K300 BOTH 650 650 GATE u*u 651 651 ASSIGN u+ K300 652 652 SAVEX *u KO 653 653 LOGIC R*U 798 
65U SAVEX 175 Kl 6U7 
655 SAVEX 175 K2 6U7 
656 SAVEX 175 K3 6U7 
657 COMPARE Mfl GE V36 658 
658 ASSIGN U* K300 ALL 659 
659 COMPARE x*U GE KU 656 
66o COMPARE x*U E K3 655 
661 COMPARE x»U E K2 65U 
662 COMPARE x*U E Kl 652 
38U TABULATE 1U 386 
3U6 TABULATE 15 BOTH 388 
3b8 COMPARE V31 LE KO 390 
390 TABULATE 16 392 
3y2 ASSIGN 8 KO 39U 
39U TABULATE 17 U50 
396 ASSIGN 8 V31 39U 
398 TABUMTE 18 671 




START OF INTERCEPTOR AVAILABILITY AND CONTROL SECTION 
SUB-SECTION I 
5oo ORIGINATE 1 1 7 502 
502 ASSIGN 1 V6 SOU 
5oU ASSIGN 1+ Kl 506 
506 SAVEX 118* Kl 508 
506 LOOP 1 510 798 
510 ASSIGN 2 X118 512 
512 Sir-LIT 51U 506 
5iU ASSIGN U V16 516 
516 ASSIGN 5 V9 518 
518 SEIZE *2 BOTH 520 578 *5 
SUB-SECTION II 
520 COMPARE xiiU L V7 522 
522 SAVEX 11U+ Kl 52U 
52U MARK 526 
526 SAVEX 117- Kl 528 
528 ASSIGN 3 FNU 530 
530 TABULATE 1 532 
532 TABULATE 2 53U 
53U SAVEX *2 Kl 536 
536 ADVANCE 537 
537 COMPARE Ml GE ' K5 BOTH 5U1 
539 COMPARE Ml GE V16 538 
SUB-SECTION III 
5Ul GATE LSU 5U3 
5U3 ASSIGN U vUo 5U5 
5U5 SAVEX 172 P2 5U7 
5U7 ALSIGN 2+ K300 5U9 
5U9 SAVEX •2 PU 551 
551 ASSIGN u P2 553 553 SPLIT 555 
555 ASSIGN 2- K300 538 
557 ADVANCE ALL 620 
620 COMPARE X*2 GE KU 6U9 
621 COMPARE X*2 E K3 6U9 
622 COMPARE X*2 E K2 6U9 
623 COMPARE X*2 E Kl 6U9 






538 RELEASE »2 5UO 
5UO TABULATE 3 5UU 
5UU SAVEX 115+ Kl BOTH UL U3 
UL GATE U*2 5U2 
1.3 COMPARE Ml GE Vl.3 5U2 
Sh2 MARK 1 U$ 
U5 ASSIGN 3 V18 BOTH 5U6 602 
51.6 COMPARE Ml GE V19 BOTH $U8 606 
5U8 COMPARE X117 G V7 559 
559 ASSIGN 8 P2 561 
561 ASSIGN 8+ K300 78 
602 COMPARE X*2 GE V8 BOTH 60l. 5U6 
60U GATE 
606 SAVEX 1164 Kl 
60U GATE U*2 BOTH 5U8 606 
, .„r.v mAj. Kl 559 
* SUB-SECTION V 
78 GATE NU*2 563 
563 ASSIGN 7 X#8 BOTH 88 90 
88 COMPARE P7 G KO BOTH 92 9U 
92 COMPARE V37 G Vhk 96 
95 ASSIGN 6 VU7 565 
93 ASSIGN 6 Vl.6 565 
n A ADVANCE .5 93 95 
ASSIGN 6 Vh5 
90 ASSIGN 6 VU7 
96 ADVANCE , • tAcr 
9U U 565 
, . 
56$ LOGIC S*8 ALL 613 6l> 
613 GATE LR*8 
6lU COMPARE Ml 
615 COMPARE X*2 
550 ADVANCE 
GE V21 550 
G V8 550 
552 
SUB-SECTION VI 
552 SEIZE *2 55U 
55U TABULATE U 556 
556 SAVEX 117- Kl 558 
558 TABULATE 5 
$60 SAVEX 115- Kl 56U 
$6U TABULATE 6 5o° 
$66 SAVEX *2- Kl 565 
$68 TABULATE 7 570 




FN 7 ™ 6 
578 57U ADVANCE 576 TABULATE 9 
$78 ADVANCE A L L 586 588 
586 COMPARE X116 GE Kl 590 
$87 COMPARE SI G V25 592 
588 COMPARE 01 G V 2 8 52U 
$90 SAVEX 116- KL 52U 
















610 TABULATE 798 
80 
» START OF INTERCEPTOR SELECTION SECTION 
700 ORIGINATE 1 1 7 702 
702 ASSIGN 1 V35 70U 
70U ASSIGN 1 K15 706 
706 BUFFER 708 
708 ADVANCE .5 710 726 
710 ASSIGN 1* KL BOTH 712 730 
712 COMPARE PI LE V6 BOTH 71U 710 
71U GATE NU*1 716 
716 LOGIC R2 718 
718 LOGIC R3 720 
720 SAVEX 200 PI 722 
722 LOGIC SI 72U 
72U GATE LR1 725 
725 GATE LR5 708 
726 ASSIGN 1- Kl BOTH 728 7liU 
728 COMPARE Pl GE KL BOTH 71U 726 
730 ADVANCE BOTH 732 738 
732 GATE LS2 73U 
73U LOGIC R2 736 
736 ADVANCE 738 
738 ADVANCE .5 7U0 750 
7U0 LOGIC S2 7U2 
7U2 ASSIGN 1 Kl BOTH 71U 710 
7UU ADVANCE BOTH 7U6 738 
7U6 GATE LS3 7U8 
7U8 LOGIC R3 736 
750 LOGIC S3 752 
752 ASSIGN 1 V6 BOTH 71U 726 
798 TERMINATE 
U50 TERMINATE R 
APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
RESULTS OF FIRST EXPERIMENT 
Number of Escapees/ Bomber Neutralization Distance 
Random 
Number Seed Defense 
20Q 






































I V 6 U . U A 
9 / 7 3 . 6 8 
10 /6U .20 
7 /7U.55 
9 / 7 1 . 3 3 
8 / 7 7 . 6 9 
9 / 6 8 . 8 8 
8 /70 .07 
1 1 / 6 8 . 6 U 
7 /72 .08 
1 0 / 6 9 . 9 9 
7 /73 .76 
3 / 7 6 . 2 8 
1 5 / 6 5 . 0 3 
6 / 7 9 . 8 1 
1 2 / 6 5 . 7 1 
8 / 6 9 . 2 3 
1 0 / 6 8 . 0 5 
U/7U.87 
8 / 7 6 . U 7 
|L2 /67 .89 
7 / 7 0 . U 5 
8 / 7 0 . 3 9 
7 / 7 2 . 6 8 
9 / 7 3 . 2 8 
6 / 7 U . 7 7 
1 5 / 5 7 . 6 5 
117/58.77 
7 /75 .32 
5 / 7 9 . 1 7 
1 0 / 7 5 . 1 6 
7/75.UO 
1 2 / 6 7 . 3 3 
1 U / 6 U . 1 2 
1 3 / 6 3 . 9 9 
9 / 6 9 . 0 9 
5 /117 .87 
6 / 1 1 9 . 0 0 
2 / 1 1 7 . 5 1 
2/113.83" 
6 / 1 1 5 . 3 1 | 
8 /100 .37 
7 / l01 .U0| 
3 /118 .87 
3/122.07J 
U/107.52 
1 / SU.03I 
1 /121.08 
5 / 1 1 0 . 6 1 
5 / H 5 . 0 3 
U / H 9 . U 3 
2 / 1 1 7 . 1 7 
2 / 1 1 6 . 1 1 
6 /109 .88 
8 / 1 0 U . 1 1 
5 / 117 .69 
7/105.U7 
2 /119 .92 
3 / 1 2 1 . 9 2 
U / U 6 . 2 5 
3 /111 .36 
6 /108 .55 
U/123.87 
U/115.52 
6 /11U .U5 
U/116.57 
5 / 1 1 5 . 9 1 
9 /102 .20 
3 /115 .67 
0 / 12U.31 
U / H 7 . I 4 L 
U / L L L . 5 9 
1/153.81.] 
3 /151 .33 , 
3 / 1 U 9 . 5 5 
2 / 1 3 7 . 3 5 
1 /153 .89 
2 /168 .U9 
2/L55.6O| 
3 /1U6.76 




2 /153 .99 
U/1U7.03 
0 /165 .37 
0 /16U .65 
6 / 1 3 9 . U 5 
0 / 1 7 2 . 9 2 
1 /163 .67 
6 / 1 U I . 6 I 




1 / 1 6 0 . 2 1 
2 /152 .03 
3 /1UU.97 
3 /1U2.00 
1 /156 .79 
U/151 .96 
5 /160 .23 
1 / 1 6 7 . 3 1 
2 /150 .6U 
2 / 1 5 5 . 1 3 
2 /158 .69 
2 / 1 5 2 . U 1 
1 /205 .39 
5 /163 .05 
7 / 1 6 U . 1 6 
3 / 1 8 9 . M 
7 /183 .83 
7/193.25 5 /198 .96 
6 / 1 7 8 . 9 2 1 3 / 1 5 6 . 5 3 
0/22U.6£ V 2 2 7 . 0 9 
3 /185 .97 6 /219 .77 
1/221.95 1 /235.20 





3 / 1 9 1 . 1 7 
5 /186 .87 
2 /177 .56 
2 /230 .57 6 / 2 0 5 . 6 U 
2 /217 .39 3 / 2 1 7 . 1 2 
0 / 2 3 3 . 1 5 U/228 .05 
2 /20U.76 3 / 2 1 8 . 8 1 
3/231.80| 
2 / 1 9 2 . 1 7 
1 /213 .27 
1 / 1 8 0 . 2 5 T L / L U 9 . 5 3 I 
0 / 1 8 9 . U U 
2 / 1 9 1 . 0 3 
2 / 1 8 3 . 1 6 
0 / 1 9 3 . 3 7 
2 /178 .67 
2 / 1 7 3 . 1 7 
3 /202 .76 
1 / 1 9 0 . 2 1 
U/160.67 
0 / 1 9 8 . 8 U 
3 /177 .8U 
U /168 .95 
U /171 .65 
8 / 1 5 9 . 6 5 
1 /208 .35 
5 / 1 5 6 . 2 8 
U/167 .60 
6 / 1 6 6 . 9 7 
8 /167 .U5 
3 / 1 9 3 . 1 2 
1/189.UO 
0 / 1 8 6 . 8 9 
6 / 1 9 5 . 3 6 
2/199.53! 
3 /233 .56 
5 /18U.59 
U/202.27| 
3 /193 .65 
1 /217.09 
U /197 .05 





7 /155 .UU 
1 /215 .09 
U/201.U8| 
3 / 199 .99 
0 / 2 3 3 . U 1 
8 / 1 6 9 . 9 1 
5 / 1 5 6 . 3 2 
1 / 2 1 1 . U L 
1 /228 .U8 
2 /21U.95 
U/211 .96 
1 /228 .39 
3 /206 .UU 
5 /211 .23 
3 /229 .00 
3 / 2 U 0 . 1 6 
3 /225 .76 
6 / 1 9 0 . 6 0 
3 /207 .67 
8 /21U.73 
9 / 1 9 1 . 2 1 
5 /195 .77 
3 / 2 1 2 . 5 3 
U /209 .72 
2 / 2 2 5 . 1 6 
3 /23U.U8 
5 /220 .32 
3 /193 .U3 
0 / 2 6 1 . 6 1 
U/197.89 
2 /220 .97 
U/213.67 
6 / 2 0 1 . 8 8 
1 /223.76 
5 /207 .87 
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Defense Line Distance 
200 I 2 ^ 1 3 0 0 ) 3 2 0 
7/116.76 6/150.27 U/191.37 
7/121.1*9 5A57 .55 2/186.12 






7/120.61* 6/11+2. i+3LO/l39.20l 
15/9U.96 9/13U.05 l+/l89.0l+[ 
7/118.83L3/13U.25 1/203.51 
1 7 / 96.1+1* V165.ULO/1U6.09I 
9/118.63 3/151.81 3/203.1+7 
7 / l l l+ .27Ll/ l l+6.97 1+/185.19J 
6/121.2710/135.61 5/156. 
9/11U.51 1+/152.1+7 2/182.091 
10/101+.31 9/117.67 6/166.2A 




8/113.92 3/151.00 2/175. 
12/105.25 6/151.6C 8/165.88 
8/121 .8721 /103.W 8/150.01 
9/119 .09 8/135.27 U/172.U9 
6 / H I 4 . 0 3 6/151.75 7/165.68 
1 1 / 82.6C 12/122.1+1* 12/153.51 
11/105.16 11 /132 .9711/137 .15 
U/125.77 8/U+0.59 3/189.07 
l l / l 0 6 . 9 5 t V l 3 0 . 8 l 9/137.23 
8/117.69 7/1U8.3710/139. 
9/101.55 8/U+2.1+S 7/170.8, 
11/103 .93 8 /137 .8C 5/166. 
9/10U.3^17/110.75 5/166. 
11/105.59 U/160.1S 1/195.19) 
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